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1. Introduction
Since the publication of World Bank (1994), the debate on privatization and prefunding
of the unfunded public pension systems has focused attention on the socially optimal
choice of the contribution rates to the arising two pillars and of the degree of redistrib-
ution achieved in the public pillar. In terms of gross wage, the public contribution rate
varies across time and space dramatically: while the US social security contribution
rate is as low as 12.4%, the Hungarian rate is as high as 34%. Such differences are
due to differences in the breakdown to the employer’s and the employee’s rates, the
dependency rates (the ratios of pensioners’ number to the workers’), the replacement
rates (the ratios of average benefits to averages wages) and the share of the private
pillar in the total pension system. Similar differences exist among the degrees of redis-
tribution in the public pillars (cf. Disney, 2004): in the Netherlands and Great Britain,
the public pensions are flat or flat-rate, respectively; in Germany and most other Eu-
ropean continental countries, the benefits are proportional to lifetime contributions or
wages. In between, there are progressive systems with various degrees of redistribution:
strong in the USA and weak in Hungary. Note the interaction between the degree of
redistribution and the contribution rate: the more progressive the system, the lower is
the contribution rate.
Much less attention has been paid to the socially optimal choice of the contribution
(base) cap, officially called the maximum for taxable earnings.1 Such a cap (or ceiling)
implies an upper limit on the mandatory pension contributions as well as on the future
benefits. While the contribution rate and the degree of progressitivity affect every
individual, a well-designed cap only influences the higher-paid; nevertheless, the cap also
deserves attention. We give only two historical examples to illustrate poor design of the
cap. (i) In the 1950s, in Great Britain the cap was fixed at the minimum wage (probably
about half the average wage), degrading the usually earning-related contributions into
flat ones. It was only realized much later that such a solution reduces excessively the
flat-rate benefit and then was replaced by a much higher cap, making the rise of the
benefit and the redistribution possible within the public system. (ii) In Hungary, the
ratio of the cap to the average gross wage sank from 3.3 to 1.6 between 1992 and 1996
just to grow from 1.6 to 3.1 between 1997 and 2005. From 2013, the cap is removed.2
Like other experts, Barr and Diamond (2008, p. 63) mention two roles for the cap.
(i) Under certain conditions, the cap acts as a hidden personal income tax. For example,
in some countries, the cap only applies to the employee’s contribution and the propor-
tional benefit, therefore from an economic point of view the employer’s contribution
above the cap is a pure personal income tax.3 Similarly, for progressive benefits, the
cap limits the otherwise unbounded redistribution from the higher-paid to the lower-
1 For a summary statistics in terms of per capita GDP, see Table 1 in Valde´s-Prieto and Schwarzhaupt
(2011). The cap-to-gross wage-ratio is around 1.2 in Sweden and 1.8 in Germany. The usual statistics
give the contribution rate as well as the cap’s relative value with respect to the gross wage rather
than to the total wage. Note that these rates depend on the economically meaningless break-up of
contribution to employee’s and employer’s contributions.
2 Note also that the cap on the contributions to the tax-favored voluntary pension system is much
lower and it interacts with the mandatory one; Simonovits (2011).
3 In Hungary, the former contribution rate is 10% of the gross wage, while the latter is 24%. Until
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paid.4 (ii) The government has no mandate to force high old-age consumption on
high-earners and removing the cap would further increase the perverse redistribution
from the poor to the rich caused by the strong correlation between lifetime earning and
life expectancy.
To present a third role of the cap in the mandatory proportional public system,
we apply two widely accepted idealizations: (a) the higher the wage, the higher is the
discount factor and (b) any dollar saved privately rather than in a public pension system
raises the old-age consumption. Then the third role with a dual task can be formulated
as follows: the capped pension contribution ensures sufficient mandatory savings for
the low-earning short-sighted but leaves sufficient room for the more efficient voluntary
savings for the high-earning far-sighted. For practical reasons, it would be politically
impossible to legislate different contribution rates for different types, therefore as a
second-best solution, the government may introduce a cap on the contributions.5 For
any fixed contribution rate, the cap reduces the effective contribution rate (i.e. the
ratio of contribution to earning) of workers earning above the cap, making room for
more private savings.
We are aware that our idealizations are only approximately valid. Ad a) In addition
to the pairs described above, there are low-paid who are far-sighted and there are
high-paid who are short-sighted. Nevertheless, the correlation between discount factors
and wages appears to be strongly positive, therefore the atypical combinations can be
neglected in a first approximation. (Becker and Mulligan (1997) provide a rich theory
on the endogenous determination of time preferences.) Ad b) In fact, the voluntary
(private) saving may also be less rather than more efficient than the mandatory (public)
one, see Barr and Diamond (2008, Chapter 6). We only use idealization (b) to allow
for certain incentive problems—e.g. flexible labor supply—occurring in the mandatory
pension system.
Correspondingly we consider a very simple model, where workers only differ by their
wages and discount factors but have the same age when they start working, retire or die.
Using a paternalistic utilitarian social welfare function, where individual discounting is
eliminated, a socially optimal pension system successfully combines the dual task.6
For the sake of simplicity, we confine our analysis to proportional (contributive or de-
fined contribution) pension systems (and write contribution rather than pay-roll tax),
where the benefit is proportional to the net covered wage. Such systems have much
stronger incentives to supply labor and report earnings than the progressive ones, there-
fore these problems can be neglected.
As a starting point, we start the analysis with the capless system (cf. Simonovits,
2013). If everybody is totally myopic, then the socially optimal contribution rate is
2013, the uncapped contributions alone provided 6% of the total pension contributions and would have
provided 10% of the de facto personal income tax.
4 In the US, the progressivity of the Social Security disappears above the cap, the latter being about
2.5 times the average wage.
5 One might object that in a lot of countries, the self-employed have a significantly lower contribution
rate than the employees have. Note, however, that this differentiation is connected more to the difficulty
of auditing the former rather than the weaker rationality of the latter.
6 Note also that in an imaginary world, where the discount factor is a decreasing rather than an
increasing function of the wage, the cap should be replaced by a floor.
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obviously equal to the maximal contribution rate—equalizing the young- and old-age
consumptions. Having accepted more or less far-sighted workers into the model, this
equality was shown to be approximately valid by numerical illustrations for a relatively
wide part of the parameter space. We shortly discuss its degenerated, single-type ver-
sion: the socially optimal contribution rate is either zero (for a sufficiently far-sighted
population) or maximal (for an insufficiently far-sighted population).
Introducing the cap, the social welfare function has two rather than one independent
variables: the contribution rate and the cap. To obtain sharp results, we introduce a
continuous-type model. We conjecture and show by numerical calculations that having
a cap, the socially optimal replacement rate is higher than without a cap. To be more
concrete, we shall work with the Pareto-2 distribution (where the minimum wage is just
half the average wage and the wage variance is infinite) because it is analytically very
convenient and approximates the distribution of high wages quite well (cf. Diamond
and Saez, 2011). Furthermore, a sufficiently myopic population (represented by the
discount factor-wage elasticity ξ = 0.2 in (15)) and a moderate annual real interest
rate (3.7%), the socially optimal contribution rate is close to the maximal one (0.333)
and the socially optimal cap is equal to the average wage, covering 71% of the workers
(Tables 2 and 3). By diminishing the discount factor–wage curve or using alternative
utility functions, the socially optimal cap can rise even higher (cf. Simonovits, 2012).
Note, however, that as is usual, the utilitarian social welfare hardly changes with the
cap in the relevant interval. There is a wide interval [0.75, 2], where—slightly raising the
cap—the marginal gains of the lower-paid and short-sighted workers are approximately
canceled by the marginal losses of the higher-paid and far-sighted workers (Table 3).
For other parameter vectors, the maximal efficiency gain due to introducing the cap is
about 0.3–4.5% with respect to the capless case. In other words: one has to increase
proportionally all wages by 0.3–4.5% in a capless system to have the same social welfare
as in the optimal capped system with the original wages.7
It is time to discuss the related literature. Evaluating various mandatory pension sys-
tems, Feldstein (1985) and (1987) emphasized the outstanding role of different discount
factors in the accumulation of voluntary life-cycle savings and used a utilitarian pater-
nalistic social welfare function for correcting individual myopia (originally suggested by
Samuelson (1975)). As a short-cut, he neglected wage differences. In Feldstein (1985),
the optimality of the maximal contribution rate was limited to extremely myope pop-
ulation. Otherwise, assuming very high real interest rates (around 11% per year) and
workers are not excessively myopic, he established that having no pension is superior to
the flat pension.
In addition to the determination of the socially optimal contribution rate, Feldstein
(1987) compared the means-tested benefits to the flat benefits. He found that the
optimal means-tested system is typically welfare superior to the flat one, because it
limits the benefit provision to the myopes and leaves room for more efficient private
savings. (Note the similarity between the limits in Feldstein’s means-tested system and
our capped system.)
Generalizing Feldstein (1985), Cremer, De Donder, Maldonaldo and Pestieau (2008)
7 To have an idea about these numbers, we cite two similar “German” numbers from the calibrated
mode of Fehr (2000, p. 436, Table 6): raising the retirement age from 60 to 62 years or reducing the
replacement rate from 70 to 64% would increase the long-run welfare by 1 and 1.6%, respectively.
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investigated the socially optimal contribution rate, the progressive linear system and
flexible labor supply with continuous wage distribution. They confined attention to
total myopia and total farsightedness, while assumed that this distinction is independent
of earnings. They also assumed that the public and the private pension systems are
equally efficient. In their socially optimal linear pension system, the level of benefits and
the link between wage and benefits are typically increasing with the share of myopes.
(Cremer and Pestieau (2011) surveyed the related literature!)
Recently, Valde´s-Prieto and Schwarzhaupt (2011) analyzed the issue of the optimal
coercion including the choice of cap. They considered a larger set of errors of judg-
ments on remaining life span and future needs; furthermore, modeled various pension
systems. They put the value of the optimal cap near the 80th percentile of the earning
distribution.
Further research is needed to generalize the results for wider setting. We have already
alluded to the lack of redistribution, of flexible labor supply and of the progressivity of
the social welfare function in the present study. Deterministic and stochastic changes
in the relative earnings position during one’s lifetime may also be important. The
dependence of type-specific life expectancy and private saving’s efficiency on earning is
also important in practice, and may call for progressive benefits.
Note that models of this type neglect real-life dynamic complications like growth,
inflation and population aging. Therefore, in our static model, we cannot consider the
dynamic problem of carving out a private pillar from a public one (Fehr, 2000; Diamond
and Orszag, 2004 vs. Feldstein, 2005). Neither can we evaluate proposals like Diamond
and Orszag (2004) who would phase-in a 3% tax on incomes above the cap to reduce
the long-term imbalance of the US Social Security. The problem of time-inconsistency
in private savings (e.g. Laibson, 1997) is also out of scope, though the paternalistic
government makes up this omission. We do not follow Docquier (2002), who replaced
the representative generation’s social welfare function by a proper one, comprising the
life-time utilities of all present and future generations.
The structure of the remainder is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section
3 displays numerical illustrations. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Model
First we shall outline a framework, and then specify the two versions of the model.
Framework
We consider a very simple pension model, where workers only differ in wages and dis-
count factors but do not vary with age. A type can be described by his total wage w
and his discount factor δ, the joint distribution function of (w, δ) denoted by F and the
corresponding expectations by E. To replace the two- by a one-dimensional distribu-
tion, we assume that the discount factor is an increasing function of the wage: δ = δ(w).
The average wage is normalized as Ew = 1. Workers pay contributions τw up to τw¯,
where 0 < τ < 1 is the contribution rate to the mandatory pension system and w¯ is the
wage ceiling or cap. Neglecting personal income taxes, his covered total wage and net
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wage are respectively
wˆ = min(w, w¯) and v = w − τwˆ. (1)
Calculating pension benefits, a related variable is used, the net covered earning:
vˆ = (1− τ)wˆ. (2)
Note that for wages lower than or equal to the cap: w ≤ w¯, the cap’s existence is
indifferent; for wages higher than the cap: w > w¯, the cap ensures that the effective
contribution rate is lower than originally: τ˜ = τw¯/w < τ . The function of the cap is
as follows: lower-paid myopic workers can be locked into a pension system with a high
contribution rate, but higher-paid far-sighted workers pay a lower effective rate. At the
same time, there is no reason to set the cap below the minimum wage, since by replacing
the contribution rate τ by its multiple of w¯/wm < 1, namely τ ′ = τw¯/wm, (τ, w¯) is
equivalent to (τ ′, wm).
By assumption, every pension benefit is proportional (to the net covered wage):
b = βvˆ, β > 0. (3)
Everybody works for a unit period, and everybody spends a shorter (or equal) period
in retirement with a common length µ, 0 < µ ≤ 1. Hence the pension balance is simply
µβEvˆ = τEwˆ, i.e. µβ = τ/(1− τ). (4)
Since the two periods’ lengths are different, we use intensities in (5) below, i.e. quantities
per a unit time period even if it is not always mentioned.
In addition to paying mandatory pension contributions, workers can also privately
save for old-age: s ≥ 0. Denoting the compound interest factor by ρ ≥ 1, the intensity
of the decumulated saving is approximately µ−1ρs.
We can now describe the young and old-age consumption (intensities):
c = v − s and d = βvˆ + µ−1ρs. (5)
To determine the individually optimal savings, we introduce a discounted lifetime
utility function. To obtain analytical formulas, we adopt and modify Feldstein’s Cobb–
Douglas utility function by scaling the utility of old-age consumption:
U(w, δ, c, d) = log c+ µδ log d, (6)
where δ is the discount factor, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. We must distinguish two cases: either 1)
nonnegative saving intention or 2) negative saving intention. Inserting (5) into (6), the
optimum condition of type 1 is 1/c = δρ/d. Hence equation
δρv − δρs = βvˆ + µ−1ρs
yields the optimal saving intention:
si =
δρv − βvˆ
(δ + µ−1)ρ
(7)
which materializes if it is positive or zero.
Hence the type-1 optimal consumption pair are
co1(τ, w¯, w, δ) =
µ−1ρv + βvˆ
(δ + µ−1)ρ
and do1(τ, w¯, w, δ) = δρc
o
1(τ, w¯, w, δ). (8)
If si < 0, then so2 = 0, hence c
o
2 = vˆ and d
o
2 = βvˆ.
Next we study the single- and the continuous-type models.
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The single-type model
In the single-type model, every individual has the same wage w and the same discount
factor δ. Here the cap has no function but the model is a useful ground for preparation.
Using formulas (4) and (7) above, we can deduce the optimal saving function
so =
[δρ(1− τ)− µ−1τ ]w
(δ + µ−1)ρ
≥ 0 if 0 < τ ≤ τδ = δρ
δρ+ µ−1
,
where τδ is the δ-maximal contribution rate which allows for nonnegative saving inten-
tion. To avoid trivial cases with no pension at all, we assume δρ < 1.
To determine the paternalistically optimal τ (where δ = 1), we need to separate the
two cases.
For the 1-type case, the paternalistic utility function is
u1(τ, w, δ) = log co1(τ, w, δ) + µ log[δρc
o
1(τ, w, δ)]. (9)
It is easy to show that u1(·, w, δ) is a decreasing function of the contribution rate.
Indeed, inserting (8) into (9) and dropping the constant terms, the relevant function is
equal to
g1(τ) = log(ρ− (ρ− 1)τ)
which is decreasing in the interval [0, τδ].
For the 2-type case, the paternalistic utility function is
u2(τ, w) = log((1− τ)w) + µ log[µ−1τw].
It is easy to see that u2(·, w) is an increasing function of the contribution rate in the
interval τδ < τ ≤ τ¯ , where
τ¯ =
1
1 + µ−1
(10)
is the maximal contribution rate, assuring unit net replacement rate. Indeed, dropping
the constant terms,
g2(τ) = log(1− τ) + µ log τ.
Taking its derivative,
g′2(τ) = −
1
1− τ +
µ
τ
is positive in the interval [τδ, τ¯) and is negative in the interval (τ¯ , 1).
Therefore there are two extreme candidates for the optimum: τ = 0 and τ = τ¯ . To
choose between them, we introduce the critical discount factor δ∗ which equalizes the
two paternalistic utilities, satisfying the implicit equation
u1(0, w, δ∗) = u2(τ¯ , w). (11)
Note that if the private saving is efficient, i.e. ρ > 1, then (0 <)δ∗ < 1.
We have proved the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. In the single-type model with efficient private savings, no cap is needed
and the optimal contribution rate is maximal [(10)] for subcritical discount factors and
zero for supercritical discount factors; furthermore it is equal to the maximum and zero
for the critical discount factor:
τ∗ =
{
τ¯ if 0 ≤ δ < δ∗;
0, τ¯ if δ = δ∗;
0 if δ∗ < δ ≤ 1.
Remark. In the limit, when the private saving is as efficient as the mandatory
pension system, i.e. ρ = 1, then δ∗ = 1. By δρ < 1, now δ < 1, in the optimum, there
is no place for private savings. From now on, ρ > 1 is always assumed.
We can now formulate a trivial
Corollary. For multi-type models, a) if all discount factors are lower than the
critical one, then the Pareto-optimal contribution rate and the corresponding cap are
equal to the maxima; b) if all discount factors are higher than the critical one, then the
Pareto-optimal contribution rate is zero, while the corresponding cap is indifferent.
Note that both cases cover quasi-single-type populations.
Continuous distributions of types
Next we turn to the more realistic and genuinely multi-type model, namely with con-
tinuous wage and discount factor distributions. (Following Feldstein (1985) and (1987),
in an earlier version, Simonovits (2012) discussed two- and three-type models as well,
while working with discounted Leontief utility functions.)
Let the discount factor δ(w) be a monotone increasing function of the wage w in
the interval [wm, wM ] with 0 < wm < wM ≤ ∞ and be also continuous. Let the wage
distribution have a positive density function f and a corresponding distribution function
F (w) =
∫ w
wm
f(ω) dω
with F (wm) = 0 and F (wM ) = 1. Furthermore, δm = δ(wm) and δM = δ(wM ),
0 ≤ δm < δM ≤ 1. To avoid triviality (when either there is no pension system or no
private saving) we assume that the lowest earner does not save enough and the highest
earner would save enough in the absence of pension system. In formula
ρδ(wm) < 1 < ρδ(wM ).
Before defining the social welfare function, we reformulate the indirect paternalis-
tic utility function, dropping the notational distinction between the two regimes and
suppressing the third argument δ(w):
u[τ, w¯, w] = log c[τ, w¯, w] + µ log d[τ, w¯, w].
If it were possible to apply a wage-dependent contribution rate τ(w), then by
Theorem 1, the Pareto-optimum would be trivial: to request maximal participation
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for subcritical earners (δ(w) < δ∗) and relieve participation for supercritical earners
(δ(w) > δ∗), where criticality is defined already by (11).
We now turn realistically to a uniform contribution rate τ . The government chooses
this parameter and the contribution base cap w¯ to maximize the expected value of the
paternalistic, undiscounted indirect utility functions, i.e.
V (τ, w¯) = Eu[τ, w¯, w]→ max .
The socially optimal cap will frequently be an interior point in (wm, wM ).
We shall need the notion of critical wage w∗ = w∗(τ, w¯), which makes the saving
intention 0. Here the two regions’ utility functions are equal:
u1[τ, w¯, w∗] = u2[τ, w¯, w∗]
If there is no such a wage, i.e. for a high enough contribution rate, the saving intention
is negative for any wage, then by definition, the critical wage is identified with the
maximal wage.
We can now reformulate the social welfare function as follows:
V (τ, w¯) =
∫ w∗
wm
u2[τ, w¯, w]f(w) dw +
∫ wM
w∗
u1[τ, w¯, w]f(w) dw.
Further analysis would yield another theorem on the necessary condition for optimality
but it would have only of limited use. As Simonovits (2013) demonstrates, even in the
capless case, the first-order condition can determine not only the locally maximal but
also locally minimal contribution rate. We stay content with a
Conjecture. Assume that the suboptimal contribution rate in the capless system
is less than the maximum: τ∞ < τ¯ . Then the socially optimal contribution rate τ∗ with
cap w∗ lies between them: τ∞ < τ∗ < τ¯ .
As a heuristic justification, note that the introduction of a cap reduces the effective
contribution rates of those earners whose wages are higher than the cap and leaves
the others unaffected. If a high cap is introduced and the capless optimal contribution
rate is slightly raised, then the gains of the low-paid and of the high-paid more than
compensate for the losses suffered by those who are around but above the critical wage
w∗, whose savings and utilities are slightly diminished.
It is not enough to determine the social optimum, we must evaluate the efficiency
gain of having an optimal pension system (τ∗, w¯∗) with respect to having a suboptimal
one (without cap). Since the numerical value of V has no direct meaning, we define
the relative efficiency ε of (τ∗, w¯∗) with respect to (τ∞,∞) as follows: multiplying the
earnings by a positive scalar ε such that the social welfare of the no cap system is the
same as the social welfare of the optimal cap with the original wages. Denoting the
dependence of the welfare on the (average) wage ε, we have the following definition for
efficiency:
V [ε, τ∞,∞] = V [1, τ∗, w¯∗].
Due to the specific utility function, (1 + µ) log ε can be separated in the LHS, i.e.
V [1, τ∞,∞] + (1 + µ) log ε = V [1, τ∗, w¯∗], i.e. ε = exp V [1, τ
∗, w¯∗]− V [1, τ∞,∞]
1 + µ
.
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Pareto-distribution
We assume that wages follow a Pareto-distribution with a density function
f(w) = σwσmw
−1−σ for w ≥ wm,
where σ > 1 is the exponent of the distribution and wm is the minimum wage. It is
easy to give an explicit formula for the distribution function:
F (w) =
∫ w
wm
f(ω) dω = 1− wσmw−σ for w ≥ wm. (12)
Hence F (wm) = 0 and F (∞) = 1, and its expectation can explicitly be calculated:
Ew =
∫ ∞
wm
wf(w) dw =
σwm
σ − 1 .
Since we normalized the expected wage as unity, the minimum wage is given as
wm =
σ − 1
σ
.
In practice, σ ≈ 2, then wm ≈ 1/2. We also display the second moment of the Pareto-
distribution:
Ew2 =
σw2m
σ − 2 =
(σ − 1)2
σ(σ − 2) for σ > 2 and Ew
2 =∞ otherwise.
For our unbounded distribution, let wN be the maximal value at which the wage
distribution is cut in the numerical illustrations and we represent all the wages above
wN by a cleverly chosen wK . By definition,
1 =
∫ wN
wm
wf(w) dw + [1− F (wN )]wK . (13)
The expected censored wage (given in the integral in (13)) is equal to
Emin(w,wN ) = 1− w
σ
mw
−σ+1
N
σ − 1 , (14)
hence (12), (13) and (14) yield
wK =
σ
σ − 1wN .
For example, for σ = 2, the representative highest wage is double of the “maximum”:
wK = 2wN .
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3. Numerical illustrations
Even though our framework is very elementary, our problem is quite involved, therefore
we turn to numerical illustrations.
Critical discount factor
Unlike others (e.g. Feldstein (1985), (1987) and Cremer et al. (2008)) we have distin-
guished the lengths of the working and of the retirement periods. (On the other hand,
we have confined attention to a stationary population and economy!) Assuming 40-year
working and 20-year retirement periods, the length-ratio is 1/2 rather than 1. By this
way, we receive more realistic numbers. For example, even in our stationary economy
and population, the socially optimal contribution rate τ¯ = 1/(1 + µ−1) in (10) drops
from 1/2 to 1/3 as we replace µ = 1 by 0.5. If we took into account that the socially
optimal discount factor is less than one (e.g. labor disutility, reduced family size, etc.,
as postulated by Cremer et al. (2008)), then we could reduce the contribution rate
further, even to 1/4.
We shall calculate as if the whole saving and dissaving occurred at the middle points
of the working and retirement periods, namely at adult ages 20 and 50 years, respec-
tively.
We start with the tabulation of the critical discount factor as a function of the
interest factor. Recall that for workers with subcritical discount factors, the maximal
contribution rate is optimal; while for workers with supercritical discount factors, the
zero contribution rate is optimal (cf. Theorem 1). It is qualitatively obvious that
the lower the interest factor, the higher the critical discount factor. Table 1 gives the
quantitative answer. For example, for the modest annual interest factor of 1.023, the
critical annual discount factor is quite high: 0.947, while for the super high annual
interest factor of 1.089, the critical annual discount factor is quite low: 0.883.
Table 1. Critical discount factor as a function of interest factor
Compound Annual Compound Annual
interest factor critical discount factor
ρ ρ(1) δ∗ δ∗(1)
2 1.023 0.197 0.947
3 1.037 0.118 0.931
5 1.055 0.066 0.913
7 1.067 0.046 0.902
9 1.076 0.035 0.894
11 1.083 0.029 0.889
13 1.089 0.024 0.883
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Pareto-2 distribution and the role of the cap
We shall assume that wages are distributed along a Pareto-distribution. To give a flavor
of the behavior of the Pareto-2 distribution, we display selected values of the distribution
function and the covered expected earnings. The median wage is about 0.71. Note how
fast the probability of being fully covered converges to 1 as the relative value of the cap
goes to 4, and how slowly the share of the covered earnings does so. For example, 1.6%
of all the earners still have 12.5% of the total earnings (last row).
Table 2. Pareto-probabilities and covered earnings for varying caps
Earning cap Probability Share of covered earnings
w¯ F (w¯) F (w¯)E(w|w < w¯)
0.707 0.500 0.250
1.0 0.750 0.500
1.5 0.889 0.667
2.0 0.938 0.750
2.5 0.960 0.800
3.0 0.972 0.833
4.0 0.984 0.875
Remark. σ = 2.
Recall that in our model, the discount factor is an increasing function of the wage:
δ = δ(w). To map an infinite interval into a finite one, we assume the simple relation
δ(w) = (δm − δM )eξ(wm−w) + δM , (15)
where ξ > 0 stands for the discount factor–wage elasticity. Note that for any finite wN ,
δ(wN ) < δM , but for high wN/wm, the error is small. We shall work with δm = 0,
δM = 1. For this special choice, ξ = −δ′(w)/δ(w) is indeed the discount factor–wage
elasticity and typically we shall work with ξ = 0.2.8
Table 3 displays the impact of the choice of the cap between 0.5 and 2 for ρ = 3 and
ξ = 0.2 with the optimal contribution rate τ∗ = 0.33. Relative efficiency is calculated
with relation of no cap (i.e. w¯ =∞). Note that in this example, the relative efficiency
is lower than 1 for the minimum wage w¯ = 0.5: ε = 0.993 and rises above 1 until it
reaches 1.01 for the average wage and then slowly declines. Even at the double of the
average wage, the relative efficiency is still 1.005. The critical wage (at which the saving
intention turns from negative to positive) is always greater than the cap if and only if
the cap is less than 2.5.
8 We shall divide the interval [wm, wM ] into n = 200 subintervals such a way that the division points
wi form a geometrical sequence: and at integration, the representative points are the geometrical means
of the subsequent points: wi+1 = qwi and zi =
√
wiwi+1. The mass of the remaining infinite part is
1− F (wM ) = 0.0001 (with wM = 50) and the earning wK = 100 represents the average highest wage.
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Table 3. The impact of cap on efficiency and savings
Relative Expected Critical
Cap efficiency saving wage
w¯ ε Es∗ w∗
0.50 0.993 0.056 1.094
0.57 1.000 0.054 1.199
0.75 1.008 0.051 1.315
1.00 1.010 0.046 1.510
1.25 1.009 0.043 1.734
1.50 1.007 0.040 1.901
2.00 1.005 0.035 2.183
2.50 1.003 0.032 2.506
3.00 1.002 0.027 2.506
. . . . . . . . . . . .
∞ 1 0 –
Remark. ξ = 0.2, ρ = 3, ρ(1) = 1.037 and τ∗ = 0.33.
In the remainder we shall investigate the sensitivity of the social optimum to the
parameter values, namely to the wage elasticity of the discounting factor and to the
interest factor.
Optimal contribution rate without cap
First we display the impact of the contribution rate in a capless system. Fixing first
the 30-year interest factor as ρ = 3, Table 4 shows that as the discount factor–wage
elasticity ξ rises from 0.1 to 0.7, the socially optimal contribution rate sinks from 0.331
to 0.257, and the corresponding net replacement rate drops from 0.99 to 0.692.
Table 4. The socially optimal contribution and replacement rates, changing elasticity
Wage elasticity Contribution Net replace- Expected
of discount factor rate ment rate saving
ξ τ∞ β Es∗
0.1 0.331 0.990 0.008
0.2 0.325 0.963 0.015
0.3 0.317 0.928 0.023
0.4 0.306 0.882 0.031
0.5 0.293 0.829 0.039
0.6 0.278 0.770 0.048
0.7 0.257 0.692 0.059
Remark. ρ = 3, ρ(1) = 1.037.
In Table 5, we discuss the sensitivity of the outcomes to the interest factor. As the
interest factor ρ rises from 2 to 13 (at an annual level, from 1.023 to 1.089), the socially
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optimal contribution rate drops from 0.331 to 0 and the corresponding net replacement
rate sinks from 0.99 to 0.
Table 5. The socially optimal rates, changing interest factor
Interest Annual interest Contribution Net replace- Expected
f a c t o r rate ment rate saving
ρ ρ(1) τ∞ β Es∗
2 1.023 0.331 0.990 0.008
3 1.037 0.325 0.963 0.015
5 1.055 0.303 0.869 0.027
7 1.067 0.268 0.732 0.037
9 1.076 0.224 0.577 0.046
11 1.083 0.168 0.404 0.056
13 1.089 0 0 0.081
Remark. ξ = 0.2.
Optimal contribution rate and cap
We have already conjectured that the introduction of the cap raises the optimal con-
tribution rate with respect to the capless case. Comparing Table 6 to Table 4, our
conjecture is confirmed. When ξ rises from 0.1 to 0.7, the socially optimal contribution
rate sinks much slower than in the capless case, but the socially optimal cap drops from
1.6 to 0.5. (For ξ = 0.04, the socially optimal cap rises to 3.6!) Here we also display the
relative efficiency of the capped system to the corresponding capless one: it rises from
1.003 to 1.036.
Table 6. The socially optimal cap, changing ξ
Wage elasticity Relative Expected
of discount factor Cap efficiency saving
ξ w¯∗ ε Es∗
0.1 1.6 1.003 0.027
0.2 1.0 1.010 0.046
0.3 0.8 1.017 0.062
0.4 0.7 1.023 0.074
0.5 0.6 1.029 0.087
0.6 0.6 1.032 0.095
0.7 0.5 1.036 0.107
Remark. ρ = 3, τ = 0.33.
Finally, we check the impact of the interest factor ρ for a fixed elasticity, again
ξ = 0.2. As the 30-year-period interest factor rises from 2 to 13 in Table 7, the socially
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optimal contribution rate drops slowly but then suddenly from 0.33 to 0.23. The de-
crease in the socially optimal cap starts immediately: from 1.5 to 1 and then to the
minimum wage, namely 0.5. The relative efficiency of the capped system with respect
to the corresponding capless one rises from 1.03 to 1.048 and then drops back to 1.033.
Table 7. The socially optimal contribution rate and the cap, changing interest factor
Compound Annual Contribution Relative Expected
interest factor rate Cap efficiency saving
ρ ρ(1) τ∗ w¯ ε Es∗
2 1.023 0.333 1.5 1.003 0.036
3 1.037 0.332 1.0 1.010 0.046
5 1.055 0.329 0.7 1.026 0.056
7 1.067 0.318 0.6 1.039 0.062
9 1.076 0.319 0.5 1.048 0.066
11 1.083 0.279 0.5 1.048 0.068
13 1.089 0.228 0.5 1.033 0.071
Remark. ξ = 0.2.
We have not commented the changes in saving as a result of imposing a cap (last
columns of Tables 4–7). Typically the socially optimal expected saving is higher than
the suboptimal one: Es∗ > Es∞ but for the unrealistically high compounded interest
factor ρ = 13, the capless suboptimal contribution rate is so much lower than the capped
one: 0 < 0.228, that the order of saving is reversed: 0.071 < 0.081.
In summary, some results (especially on the optimal contribution rate) are quite
robust, while other results (notably on the socially optimal cap) are very sensitive to
the key parameters of the model, namely to the discount factor–wage elasticity (ξ) and
the interest factor (ρ).
4. Conclusions
We have constructed a very simple model of the proportional pension system to analyze
the impact of the socially optimal contribution rate and especially of the contribution
(base) cap on the social welfare (and private savings). We have concentrated on the
contradiction between the needs of low-earning myopic and of high-earning far-sighted
types: the former need a high contribution rate to make up for their low saving inten-
tions; the latter need a low contribution rate to make room for their high and efficient
saving. Under certain plausible conditions, the socially optimal contribution rate in a
capless system is close to the maximal one, approaching the old-age consumption of the
lower-paid, shorter-sighted to their young-age one. A politically convenient compromise
is the introduction of an appropriate cap on the contribution: a well-chosen cap does not
diminish the contribution as well as the utility of the myopes but relieves the far-sighted
from a part of the contribution burden.
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This model is just the beginning. It neglects very important issues: the heterogeneity
of the life spans and of the interest factors. In fact, the expected life span and the interest
factor rise with lifetime wages. This may suggest the introduction of progressive pension
systems, for example, the proportional part is complemented by a uniform basic benefit.
Then the analysis of the progressive personal income tax also comes to the fore. The
flexibility of the labor supply and the underreporting of the true labor income are
other important issues, which have been studied with other, related elementary models
(Cremer et al., (2008) and Simonovits (2009)).
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